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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES
U. C. A. 76-8-510 provides:
A person commits a felony of the second degree if,
believing that an official proceeding or investigation is
pending or about to be instituted, he:
1) Alters, destroys, conceals, or removes anything with a
purpose to impair it verity or availability in the
proceeding or investigation. . . .
U.C.A. 76-8-501(1) defines official proceeding as:
. . .any proceeding before a legislative, judicial, administrative,
or other governmental body or official authorized by law to
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other person taking evidence in connection with any of those
proceedings.
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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT
Authority for said appeal is found within the confine of Section
Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; Utah State
Constitution Article 1, Section 12; Utah Code Annotated Section 77-1
6(g); and Section 78-2-2 (i) Utah Code Annotated, and the Rule of the
Utah Court of Appeals.

STATEMENT OF CASE
This is a appeal from an order of sentencing. The essence of
the appeal is that the evidence is insubstantial and the
conviction should be set aside.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
The Defendant, Joseph Gonzales ("Gonzales") was
the offense of 'Tampering with Evidence' pursuant to
Ann. § 76-8-510 (1975).

convicted of
Utah Code

He was co-defendant with two others.

The

information accused Roger Hicks of Unlawful Discharge of a Firearm
3

in Count I.

Gonzales, Hicks and Norton in Count 2 with

with Evidence'.

'Tampering

A fourth defendant (Tug Todd) was also accused in

the initial documents; however,

said defendant, in exchange for a

compromise of his charges, testified for the State.
The date of the accused acts was August 17, 1997.

The

'evidence tampering' charge accused Gonzales of altering or
concealing anything with a purpose to impair its availability in the
proceeding or investigation, believing that an official proceeding or
investigation is pending. Mr. Hicks was accused of firing from the car
five shots at two people.
Initially, in the opening statement, the State limited their
argument to Mr. Gonzales assisting in the concealment a firearm in a
glove box. The State, in their closing argument, modified their
position and argued that he hid a small package of marijuana (89
grams) in the backseat of a car driven and owned by Hicks.
The defendant seeks to review the evidence placed in a light
most favorable to the prosecution.

This evidence reveals that a

shooting did occur within the City of Orem, Utah on the subject date.
Leila Peacock testified that five (5) shots were fired in her direction
from a car being driven by Roger Hicks.

Gonzales was an occupant in

the car when the shooting took place. Gonzales was riding in the left
4

rear portion of the suspect vehicle with three other men. Mr. Todd
(State's witness) was seated next to Gonzales in the right rear portion
of the vehicle. Brad Norton was seated in the front passenger side.
Roger Hicks was driving. (This positioning of the passengers and
drivers is generated from the testimony of all police officers.

It

contradicts Todd's testimony. Todd asserted that he was seated
behind the driver and Gonzales was in the back right passenger
seat.)
Peacock identified a large dark male as the shooter.

This

matches the description of the driver, Roger Hicks. It excludes
Gonzales, Norton, and Todd.
weapon.)

(No one suggest that Gonzales fired the

All evidence suggest that the shooting was done by Hicks.

(Hicks was later, in a subsequent trial, convicted of Count I; Norton's
case was dismissed on Count 2; Tug Todd provided evidence for the
State and all charges were compromised.)
The suspect vehicle was later stopped by Officer Simmons of
the Orem Police Department and thereafter backed by eleven
additional police officers. All four occupants of the vehicle were
detained and arrested.

During the course of the post-arrest search of

the car, a magazine/gun clip to a nine-(9) millimeter handgun was
found in or around the front "glove box" area of the vehicle.
5

Evidence at trial, from the police officers involved, showed only
the front passengers of the vehicle would have any reasonable
likelihood of hiding or secreting a gun or clip in the "glove box" area.
This evidence would exclude the defendant Gonzales from the charge
of "tampering with evidence' via the clip (glove box) and lead to the
only logical conclusion that either Hicks or Norton concealed the
firearm and/or clip.

The evidence from the prosecution's witnesses

(Tug Todd) identified the driver as doing such acts. This obviously
excluded Gonzales.

No evidence exists which would lead any

reasonable person to believe Gonzales had anything to do with the
concealment of the clip/gun. See Testimony
more fully

developed

of Officer Hendricks on-—

below.

State's witness Todd testified at trial, as a witness for the
prosecution, that he watched Mr. Hicks place the gun in the glove
box.

Todd further testified that Gonzales had no participation in the

hiding of the weapon.

Upon further search of the vehicle at the

scene of the stop, officers located eighty-nine (89) grams of
marijuana in a crease between the bench seat and back support of
the car.

In additional testimony, Todd noted that as an occupant of

the vehicle, he was the closest to the marijuana and that Gonzales
had absolutely no participation in hiding nor secreting the
6

discovered marijuana. In fact, Todd knew nothing of the marijuana
being hidden in the back seat. He saw Gonzales do nothing to hide
the marijuana. The reasonable inference is that the marijuana was at
that location prior to the shooting.

The evidence suggests only the

finding of the marijuana in the crease. (This conclusion is drawn by
the testimony of the lead officer Hendrickson.

However, for accuracy

sake, it must be noted that Officer Young found the seat to be moved
and the marijuana found beneath the seat.. Yet, this testimony is
contradicted by Officer Liddiard.) No direct evidence is given as to
when the marijuana was placed in the crease of the seat.
Without any direct evidence, the jury was then required to
speculate as to when the marijuana was placed under the seat and; if
so, at what time..

The testimony, via Tug Todd, was that the

defendant had no participation in hiding neither the gun nor the
marijuana. After the arrest, the officers reported that the defendant
acknowledged that the marijuana was his. It is also at this time that
the defendant exihibited certain behavior which could be believed to
be cockiness and disrepect for the police officers involved.
inculpatory evidence existed

No

as to when it was placed in the seat.

Was it in an effort to hide or secret the marijuana in response to the
officer's stop or had it been placed there before the time of the
7

shooting; the night before; hours before or after. Speculation and
conjective is simply offered.

The State's closing argument suggest

and encourages such speculation.
It must be weighed against the direct evidence that the
defendant did nothing.

The evidence that the defendant did nothing

comes from the State's own witness, Tug Todd. The defendant's
position is that the marijuana was located under the right rear
portion of the back seat. This is the location of Mr. Todd. Todd is also
the last one to leave the car after stop. He is the one nearest where
the marijuana was to be found. He is the State's most important
witness and the only one having direct knowledge of the conduct of
the other defendants. Excepting the direct evidence of Mr. Todd,

the

conduct of the car's occupants is left for speculation and conjecture.
Witness Todd tells of Mr. Hicks shooting, and hiding the gun. He
tells that Mr. Gonzales had nothing to do with the gun. He tells that
Mr. Gonzales had nothing to do with the marijuana. Mr. Gonzales was
not the person shooting the firearm. Mr. Todd testified that upon the
stop by the police, Mr. Hicks got out of the vehicle, followed by Mr.
Norton, then Mr. Gonzales, and then Mr. Todd. He knew nothing
about marijuana being in the car and had no recollection of any
marijuana being present in the car. There was no discussion about
8

marijuana being in the car. He tells that Mr. Gonzales had nothing to
do with either hiding the gun, or hiding marijuana.
Todd reports that Mr. Hicks threw the gun in the glove
compartment. The marijuana was a complete surprise to Mr. Todd.
According to Mr. Todd it would have been impossible for Mr.
Gonzales to reach up and hide the gun in the jockey box. Lead
Detective Hendrickson also confirms this.
Todd tells that if Mr. Gonzales hid the marijuana in the back
seat,

Mr. Todd would noticed since he was the last to leave the car.

Mr. Todd did not have any memory of standing up or coordinating in
any way to hide the marijuana under the full bench seat. The fair
conclusion is that the marijuana must have been stored there far in
advance of the shooting and police stop.
The evidence introduced to support the State's position did
nothing to bolster their case against Mr. Gonzales.

In fact, this is one

of the unusual cases where the State's witness actually supports the
defendant's

innocence.
FACTS WITH REFENCE TO TRANSCRIPT

The prosecution called the following witnesses:
1. Lea Peacock;
2. Tug Todd;
3. Randall Clement;

5. Kelly Liddiard:
6. William Young;
7. Kris Hendrickson
9

4. Darcy Simmons;

8. Denton Johnson.

Ms. Peacock identified a large male with a ponytail as being
one of the persons seen behind the Outback restaurant. See T9, L9.
She tells of 4 to 6 shots being fired in their direction. T13, LI8. She
tells us that the shots came from the driver's side of the vehicle. T16,
LI5. Shots did not come from the back seat. T16, L21. The driver was
the shooter. T16, L23. She went on to describe a large man, more
particularly a bigger, dark male, dark skinned. T17, L21. She did not
recognize Mr. Gonzales as being an occupant of the motor vehicle J18,
1-2.) and Mr. Gonzales was definitely not the person shooting the
firearm. T18, L 11
The second witness called by the State of Utah was Tug Todd.
Mr. Todd had been granted immunity by the State from prosecution.
In exchange for his testimony, Mr. Todd told the Court that Mr.
Gonzales, Mr. Hicks and Mr. Norton were with him in the vehicle. Mr.
Todd placed himself in the back seat behind the driver. T21, L3. Mr.
Todd was not aware of any marijuana being present in the vehicle.
He did not have any with him. T21, LI2. He tells us that he woke up
to gunfire and saw Mr. Hicks pulling his arm back into the window,
driver's side. T22, LI5. He witnessed Hicks place the gun on his lap
and turned around and starting heading for the freeway. T22, LI8.
10

He tells that Mr. Hicks got out of the vehicle pursuant to the police
stop first. T24, L7. Followed by Mr. Norton, T24, L9: then Mr.
Gonzales, T24. L 11 and then Mr. Todd followed T24. L 13.

Mr. Todd

told Officer Hendrickson of the Orem Police Department that he had
witnessed Mr. Hick's fire the gun and then Mr. Hicks stashed the gun
in the glove box. T25, L4. Mr. Todd knew nothing about marijuana
being in the car. T2 5,

L8.

Mr. Todd had no recollection of any

marijuana being present in the car. T26, L 19. There was no
discussion about marijuana being in the car. T26, L22. Mr. Gonzales
had nothing to do with either hiding the gun, or hiding marijuana.
T2 8,

LI8.

Mr. Hicks threw the gun in the glove compartment and

the marijuana was a complete surprise to Mr. Todd. T2 8,

LI8-23.

According to Mr. Todd it would have been impossible for Mr.
Gonzales to reach up and hide the gun in the jockey box. T 3 1 ,
if

LI3 .

the marijuana was hiding in the back seat by Mr. Gonzales, Mr.

Todd would have had to stand up to allow such to occur. T 3 1 ,

L21.

Mr. Todd did not have any memory of stand up or coordinating in
any way to hide the marijuana under the f u l l

bench seat. If the

marijuana was actually hidden under the bench seat it would have
been necessary for Mr. Todd to stand up to allow such an event to
occur. T3 1 ,

L22 T32 L3 .
11

According to Mr. Todd, Mr. Gonzales did not anything with his
hands or any other device to hide marijuana. T32,

L10-19.

Mr.

Gonzales did not even make a comment regarding marijuana. T3 1 ,
L24-T33 L2.
Mr. Simmons tells

that Mr. Hicks was driving and he recalled

Mr. Gonzales being in the back seat. T52,
placed Mr. Hicks in the driver position
right front passenger seat. T5 6,
passenger side. T56 L 16.
quadrant. T5 6,

L9.

L12-24.

Officer Simmons

150, L7. Norton was in the
Mr. Todd was in the right rear

Mi Gonzales was in fbe left rear

LI8 .

Officer Liddiaril tells us that it was a bench seat in the back.
T 73,

L2 3 .

He tells of finding the bench seat loosened upon his

approach to the vehicle. T74,

L4.

He kIK th,ti (he seat back was out

away from the rear dash, whnc it should be up tight. He tells that he
could pul Ins hand back there and pull it forward without any effort
at all. He tells that he could pick up the lower poiiion ot the seat and
pick it up without any effort. T7 4,

L4-10.

He lifted up the seat and

he found smaller bags that appeared to be marijuana. T7 4,
found the marijuana right underneath what would in
passenger's side of the rear seat. T7 6,

L 13.

He

(he drivers

L 1 1 . One must also

remember that Tug luihl said he was sitting in this position and he
12

was the last person who left the vehicle. Further, Tug Todd
remembers nothing of people hiding marijuana under the seat. T7 8,
L23.
Officer Young was next called by the State. Mr. Young tells
that Mr. Gonzales was positioned behind the driver in the back seat
and that Mr. Todd was behind the passenger portion. T83,

1-14-20.

Officer Young tells of patting down Mr. Gonzales in a frisking manner.
He tells that nothing was found upon Mr. Gonzales. T84,

L 13.

Officer young tells that he found the rear seat to be ajar, that he
could pop it lose. It was not in a snug place as it should be, it had
been released. T87, L9-12. However Officer Young tells that the
portion of the back seat which supports the back was secure. (This
would contradict Officer Liddiard's testimony) The lower portion
upon which a person would sit upon was the only cushion ajar. T87,
L 18. Officer Young tells of lifting up the bench seat and looking
under it for weapons, but finding a bag containing a substance he
knew as marijuana. T87, L20. Officer Young tells that the marijuana
was found underneath the bench seat on the right side. T88, L8. This
is the position of which Officer Simmons states Tug Todd was located.
Mr. Young finds Mr. Gonzales in the left rear portion of the vehicle,
behind the driver. T92, L25. Officer Young tells that there was no
13

way to tell when the marijuana was placed in that location, that in
fact it may have been there for days, T95, L4. As Officer Young
pulled up and had the spotlights upon the vehicle, he saw no h.uul
gestures to put anything underneath the seat. T99, L W - I > . He saw
no movement of anybody trying to puii up the back seat or
whatever. T99, L22.
Officer

Hendrickson was then called by tin State. The State

introduced an exhibit, which was the magazine found within the
firearm. T107,LI2. This constituted Exhibit 17. Exhibit 12 was the
magazine retrieved by Sergeant Young from Mr. Gonzales's pocket.
T108, L8.
Officer Hendrick

aiso testified that there was no information

that he received prior to the trial testimony that the seat was ajar in
the back.

~ '*

Tr

Officer Hendricksor

ooserving Officer

Young retrieve the marijuana from the back seat area. Officer Young
retrieved it from the non-drivers side, passenger side of the rear.
T i l l , L17-21. Officer Hendrickson agreed with Darci Simmons
placement of the occupants in the various positions within the
vehicle.

T 113, L4. Officer Hendrickson tells that the marijuana was

simply tucked between the bench and the backrest of the seat. I
114, L22. He tells that the marijuaila was not hidden underneath the
14

seat at all. T 114

L24. The marijuana was simply tucked between the

seats. T 115, L6. The officers tell that the magazine would hold 13
rounds. T 115, L 17. Eight rounds were located therein. T 115, L20.
Five were thereby missing, TI 15, L22. This would correlate to the
number of shots Ms. Peacock reports being fired. T 115, L25.
Mr. Todd was called by the defense. Mr. Todd testified that to
his recollection that the back seat was not ajar. T 169, L 1. Further
Mr. Gonzales did nothing to hide marijuana. T169, L7. Mr. Todd did
not notice any movement of the seat in any form or manner . T171,
L6. He did not feel or see Mr. Gonzales or anyone stash or put the
marijuana under the seat, or in the crease.T.171, L9.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT ONE—THE EVIDENCE IS NOT PRESENT TO JUSTIFY THE
CONVICTION.
The defendant argues that no basis exist in law for the conviction
herein. The defendant was accused a violation of U.C.A. 76-8-510.
The statute provides:
A person commits a felony of the second degree if,
believing that an official proceeding or investigation is
pending or about to be instituted, he: 1) Alters, destroys,
conceals, or removes anything with a purpose to impair it
15

verity or availability in the proceeding 01 investigation.

An official proceeding

is defined as :

. . . any proceeding before a legislative, judicial,
administrative, or other governmental body of official
authorized by law to take evidence under oath or
affirmation,
including a notary or other person taking
evidence in connection with any of these proceedings.
U.C.A. 76-8-501(1)
(Emphasis Added)

No witness testified that the defendant

jtfrred, destroyed,

concealed or removes anvlhmg; nol die gun, the clip, nor the
marijuana.

No evidence suggested that there was a purpose to

impair its verity or availability in the proceeding or investigation.
In fact, the State's ov

rtness verify that the defendant did

nothing to hide, alter, remove or conceal the gun and the clip
POINT TWO—THE MOITON TO ARREST JUDGMEN

10 ULD

HAVE BEEN GRANTED.
The trial court may arrest a jury verdict when the
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, is
so inconclusive or so inherently improbable a^ to an element of
the crime that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt as to that element (Emphasis Added).

16

Defendant argues that the evidence is not supportive of the
verdict of guilt.

No evidence is present to justify the conviction. In

fact, the evidence actually exonerates the defendant by evidencing
that he had action to justify a conclusion that he alter, removed or
conceal any evidence whether that be marijuana, a gun clip, or the
gun.

Point Three— THE OFFICER'S STOP OF THE CAR AND ITS
OCCUPANTS WAS NOT AN OFFICIAL PROCEEDING OR
INVESTIGATION.

This is not an official proceeding or investigation.
stopping the car with four occupants.
investigation has commenced.

We have police

No official proceeding or

It is not a legislative, judicial,

administrative, or governmental body nor an official authorized by
law to take evidence under oath or affirmation
Defendant argues that the statute should be read to more
strictly apply the definitions of "official proceeding or investigation"
to comport with the definition set out in U.C.A. 76-8-501(1). Is it a
'proceeding before a legislative, judicial, administrative, or other
governmental body or official authorized by law to take evidence
under oath or affirmation, including a notary or other person taking
17

evidence in connection with any of those proceedings'.

If reasonable

definitions are not imposed, the buckling of the seat belt, the
finishing of the last few drops of an alcoholic beverage create a
felony act of tampering with evidence.
DETAILED ARGUMENT
POINT ONE—THE EVIDENCE IS NOT PRESENT TO JUSTIFY THE
CONVICTION.
The defendant argues that no basis exisl in law for the conviction
herein. The defendant was accused a violation of U.C.A. 76-8-510.
The statute provides:
A person commits a felony of the second degree if,
believing that an official proceeding or investigation is
pending or about to be instituted, he: 1) Alters, destroys,
conceals, or removes anything with a purpose to impair it
verity or availability in the proceeding or investigation. . .

An official proceeding

is defined as :

. . . any proceeding before a legislative, judicial,
administrative, or other governmental body of official
authorized by law to take evidence under oath or
affirmation,
including a notary or other person taking
evidence in connection with any of these proceedings.
U.C.A. 76-8-501(1)
(Emphasis Added)

A guilty verdict is not legally valid if it is based solely on
inferences that give rise to only remote or speculative possibilities of
18

guilty. State v. Hill. 727 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah 1986);
Romero.554 P.2d 216, 219 (Utah 1976).

State v.

It must be based on at least

some measurable credible evidence to support the conviction.
No witness testified that the defendant altered, destroyed,
concealed or removes anything; not the gun, the clip, nor the
marijuana.

No evidence suggested that there was a purpose to

impair its verity or availability in the proceeding or investigation.
In fact, the State's own witness verify that the defendant did
nothing to hide, alter, remove or conceal the gun and the clip
involved in the shooting. See Testimony of Tug Todd. The same
witness testified that the defendant did nothing to conceal, hide or
secret the marijuana located in the back seat.
It is only based on mere speculation as to the defendant's
participation in hiding, or concealing any marijuana or the gun.
Witnesses did not observed the defendant hide or conceal the gun
nor the marijuana and the testimony from the State's witness (Tug
Todd) cleared the defendant of such wrongdoing.
This jury conviction is based on the supposition that the
defendant must have known or must have contributed to such
concealment; but a conviction should not be based on neither
speculation nor conjecture.
19

The dangers here are significant.

Here is a young man who

does not fit the community's demographics.

He is

Hispanic.

His co-

defendant is African-American (Mr. Hicks). Norton and Todd are
Caucasian.

From the jury perspective, hi (Mi

Gonzales) and Mr.

Hicks may present the picture of the a stereotypical gangster.

Mr

Gonzales, according to the testimony of the officers, was not
respectful of the officers and was verbally confrontive.
Societal or community bias and prejudice may sneak inu
jury's verdict,

a

cut; but certain minimal legal precautions to

protect against such evils.

One tenet of the law i<;

>le

evidence must be present, even of a in in in ml nature, to negate
racism or other negative emotions generated by the community
majority.
In

-i

State v. Brooks, 563 * .v:

an improper bias.

s

i 9 / / ) is one example of

urncu a conviction. The Court held

that the evidence was so inconclusive and unsatisfactory, as to the
identification of the defendant (African-American), there that
reasonable minds would have to emen am a reasonable doubt.

The

defendant's race became an issue there. The evidence therein was so
intolerable that the Court mandated an acquittal.

20

The victim, a store clerk, there identified the robber as a
black male, mid-to-late twenties, five feet nine inches in height,
short Afro hair style, and clean shaven. The day later in a photo lineup, the witness identified the defendant there as the robber.

At trial

the witness testified that the robber was six feet one inch tall.

Two

days after the robbery, he reported the robber to be five feet six
inches in height.

At the preliminary hearing, there was suggestion

that the robber was six feet; the same height as the witness.
Within days of the robbery, the peace officer located the
defendant there and took pictures of him.

It is noted that the

defendant was 6 foot in height, with mustache, a goatee, and
prominent bushy sideburns extending down to his jaw.

It seems

obvious that some bias existed in the Brooks jury.
The evidence here is also egregious.

No direct evidence exists

then the evidence supporting the conviction.

The evidence must

preclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence; it did not.

The

State's evidence actually clears the defendant from guilt.
The Court should correct this miscarriage of justice as in State
v. Brooks, and grant the defendant's appeal — no reasonable juror
could validity conclude that the defendant was guilty of the offense
of tampering with evidence as cited by the statute.
21

POINT TWO--THE MOIT( )N T() ARRIiST JUDGMENT SHOULD
HAVE BEEN GRANTKh
The trial court may arrest a jury verdict when the evidence,
viewed in the light most favorable i
or so inherently impr

ict, is so inconclusive

*.•-, as to an element of the crime that

reasonable minds IIIUM nave entertained a reasonable doubt as to
that element. State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983); State v.
McCardelL 652 P.2d 942 (IJtali 1982): State v. Romero, 554 P.21) 216
(Utah lc>76); State v. Workman. 852 P.2d 981 (Utah 1993); State v.
Harmon, 767 P1.2d 567 (Utah App. 1989).
In Workman, a defendant had fnvn convicted of 'sexual
exploitation1 of his I in-'liln

mi 'obstruction of justice.' The trial

court granted the motion to arrest judgment. The Court of Appeals
affirmed. Certiorari was granted.
The Supreme Court, Justice Stewart, held that the evidence that
defendant appeared in photograph depicting seven-year old
daughter with her buttocks exposed was insufficient to support
conviction for 'sexual exploitation' nor was the evidence sufficient to
support the conviction for obstruction of justice.
The 'sexual exploitation' charge evolved around a photograph
exposing the child's buttocks. The State insisted that the defendant
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knew of the picture and it exposing the child's buttocks. A person
known as Kelly took the photograph and testified at the preliminary
hearing that the defendant reacted angrily at the picture being
taken. (Analogous

to the testimony of Tug Todd who testified

that

the defendant did not hide the marijuana nor the gun). At trial, Kelly
said he did not recall the defendant's reaction. The defendant
testified that they did not know that the picture was taken until
later when the police showed it to them. The trial judge arrested
judgment because the evidence was lacking as to the defendant's
requisite mental state.
The State appealed arguing that the trial court did not apply
the proper standard in 'arresting judgment.' The Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court's ruling upholding the arrest of judgment.
Upholding the standards as set out in State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443
(Utah 1983); State v. McCardelL 652 P.2d 942 (Utah 1982): State v.
Romero. 554 P.213 216 (Utah 1976), the Supreme Court found that
the trial court may arrest a jury verdict when the evidence, viewed
in the light most favorable to the verdict, is so inconclusive or so
inherently improbable as to an element of the crime that reasonable
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to that element.
The Court further pronounced that a jury serves as the exclusive
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judge of both the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given
particular evidence and that a reviewing Court ordinarily will not
reassess credibility or re-weigh the evidence.
The Supreme Court, however, held that in unusual
circumstances, a reviewing court may reassess witness credibility.
The reviewing court may evaluate whether the evidence is so
inconclusive or inherently improbable that it could not support a
finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court then
held:
When, as here, the evidence consists solely of undisputed,
circumstantial evidence, the role of the reviewing court is
to determined (l) f whether there is any evidence that
supports each and every element of the crime charged,
and (2) whether the inferences that can be drawn from
that evidence have a basis in logic and reasonable human
experience sufficient to prove each legal element of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. A guilty verdict is not
legally valid if it is based solely on inferences that give
rise to only remote or speculative possibilities of guilt .
(Emphasis Added).
Defendant argues that the evidence is not supportive of the
verdict of guilt.

No evidence is present to justify the conviction. In

fact, the evidence actually exonerates the defendant by evidencing
that he had action to justify a conclusion that he alter, removed or
conceal any evidence whether that be marijuana, a gun clip, or the
gun.
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Point Three— THE OFFICER'S STOP OF THE CAR AND ITS
OCCUPANTS WAS NOT AN OFFICIAL PROCEEDING OR
INVESTIGATION.
A person commits a felony of the second degree if,
believing
that an official proceeding
or
investigation
is pending or about to be instituted, he:
1) Alters, destroys, conceals, or removes anything with a
purpose to impair it verity or availability in the
proceeding
or investigation.
...
An official proceeding

is defined as :

. . . any proceeding before a legislative, judicial, administrative,
or other governmental body or official authorized by law to
take evidence under oath or affirmation, including a notary or
other person taking evidence in connection with any of those
proceedings.
(U.C.A. 76-8-501(1).
This is not an official proceeding or investigation.
stopping the car with four occupants.
investigation has commenced.

We have police

No official proceeding or

It is not a legislative, judicial,

administrative, or governmental body nor an official authorized by
law to take evidence under oath or affirmation.

We simply have a

number of police officers on the freeway making a stop of a car and
its occupants.
The Utah Courts have held that swallowing a bag that the
police had taken into custody impaired the availability of that
evidence and warranted conviction under U.C.A. 76-8-510. State v.
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Wagstaff. 846 P.2d 1311 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). The manipulation of a
Breathalyzer machine in order to obtain a false reading was also
sufficient.

State v. Eaton, 701 P.2d 496 (Utah 1985).

It appears that

the Court's previous holdings run contrary to the defendant's
arguments

here.

The defendant argues that reasonable limits must be made.
Defendant also notes that current case law does not conform to
defendant's argument.

However, does a person who is being stopped

by police for a traffic violation and quickly swallows the last few
drops remaining in his beer violate this statute? Does the motorist
who being stop for a traffic violation and quickly buckles up his seat
belt violate this section?
Defendant argues that the statute should be read to more strictly
apply the definitions of "official proceeding or investigation" to
comport with the definition set out in U.C.A. 76-8-501(1). Is it a
'proceeding before a legislative, judicial, administrative, or other
governmental body or official authorized by law to take evidence
under oath or affirmation, including a notary or other person taking
evidence in connection with any of those proceedings'.

If reasonable

definitions are not imposed, the buckling of the seat belt, the
finishing of the last few drops of the beverage create a felony act.
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CONCLUSIONS
This case does not warrant conviction.

The evidence is not only

lacking but supports the defendant's acquittal.
that marijuana was located inside the car.

There is no doubt

The evidence never

addressed the time when it was placed there nor did the State
attempt to do so.

The State's own witness suggest that it must have

been there before the stop (Todd).

One officer notes that the

marijuana may have been there for days (Young).
Suggesting that defendant Gonzales hid the gun is illogical. The
best the State has to offer is that he hid the marijuana when Officer
Simmons initiate his overhead lights
otherwise.

The evidence suggest

There is no logical basis in the evidence to suggest such

facts and thereby we ask jurors to speculate.
At times when we ask jurors to speculate, sometimes ugliness
steps to the front.

DATED this

day of July, 1999.
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